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THE REVENUE ACT OF r942:
FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION

Paul G. Kauper*

T

HE Revenue Act of 1942 1 marks important changes in the substantive law. Most of these changes have been obscured by the
publicity accorded the higher rates and other features that distinguish
it as the first great taxing measure borne out of the travail of the
present conflict. Yet it is remarkable that despite the urgency of the
need for war revenues, time and -effort should have been expended by
Congressional committees and Treasury officials in working out with
care and thought revisions that constitute a notable contribution to the
clarification and restatement of the substantive law of federal taxation.
Important segments of the Internal Revenue Code have been repaired,
overhauled and serviced. Moreover, not all the changes are directed
toward the tightening of the tax statutes and the further closing of
loopholes. To be sure, some of the revisions are explained by such a
purpose. But others are designed to clarify and still others to redress
elements of unfairness and injustice in the earlier law. Many of the
changes have long been needed, and it is anomalous that we should
have waited to attend to them until caught in the war's vortex.
Not least among the substantive revisions are those relating to the
federal estate and gift taxes. Anyone acquainted in even a rudimentary
way with this section of the Internal Revenue Code could well appreciate the possibilities of reform in this field. Apart from an occasional

*

Associate Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School (on leave).
Member of the New York bar.-Ed.
1 Pub. L. 753 (H. R. 7378), 77th Cong. 2d sess., reported to the House of
Representatives by its Ways and Means Committee accompanied by Report No. 2333;
introduced in Senate as revised by its Finance Committee accompanied by Report No.
I 63 I; difference between two houses composed by Conference Committee as reported
in House Report No. 2586, submitted October 19, 1942; bill as finally agreed upon
enacted by both houses and signed by the President on October 21, 1942, at 4:30
P. M., Eastern War Time.
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bit of tinkering and patchwork,2 Congress in past years showed indifference to the need for restatement. Despite the confusion and uncertainty in which inadequately phrased sectiQns of the estate tax law
had become enmeshed, the only possibility of relief seemed to lie in
the lame and tortuous process of administrative and judicial construction and reconstruction.s
Yet there has been no lack of criticisms and suggestions. Foremost
among the experts rich in critical and constructive comment has been
Randolph Paul. As tax craftsman of skill, his interest in federal taxation has been wider than that of simply serving clients. His recently
published Federal Estate and Gift Taxation 4 was a thoroughgoing
critique of the relevant statutory provisions. Not only were the weak
· joints exposed. Mr. Paul's two volumes abounded with suggestions
for improvement. Already at the time this work was published the
author was tax adviser to the Treasury Department and since that
time has become the Treasury's General Counsel. During the course
of the hearings on the revenue bill he appeared before the Congressional committees and presented a series of recommendations. If one
compares with the revisions in the new act Mr. Paul's suggestions
expressed in his two-volume text as well as in his statement before the
House Committee on such matters as the taxation of community property, powers of appointment and insurance, together with his suggestions regarding deductions and credits,5 one is struck by the identity of
ideas there expressed. Indeed, it seems safe to say that the substantive
revisions of the estate and gift tax law are in large part Mr. Paul's
creation.
EXEMPTIONS

Before reviewing these substantive changes, some reference should
be made to the changes in exemptions. The $40,000 exemption
2

For instance, the celebrated J~int Resolution 131 of March 3, 1931, 46 Stat.

L. 1516, amending Revenue Act of 1926, § 302 (c), in order to close the loophole
opened by the per curiam decisions handed down on March 2, 1931, in the cases of
Burnet v. Northern Trust Co., 283 U.S. 782, 51 S. Ct. 342 (1931); Morsman v.
Burnet, 283 U. S. 783, 51 S. Ct. 343 (1931); McCormick v. Burnet, 283 U. S.
784, 51 S. Ct. 343 (1931). These cases were decided in reliance upon May v. Heiner,
281 U.S. 238, 50 S. Ct. 286 (1930).
3 As an excellent illustration, see the history of the insurance section of the estate
tax law, I. R. C., § 8II (g), as recounted in 1· PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT
TAXATION, c. IO (1942).
4 Reviewed by this writer in 40 M1cH. L. REv. 856 (1942).
5 See the recommendations at pp. 19-20, 24-2 5 of his. formal statement submitted March 3, 1942, to the House Ways and Means Committee, reported in l
HEARINGS ON REVENUE REVISION, 77th Cong., 2d sess: (1942), pp 91-92, 94.
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hitherto allowed for life insurance payable to specific beneficiaries has
been abolished. 6 Compensating for this in part is the increase in the
general exemption under the 1932 act as amended from $40,000 to
$60,000. 7 In other words, the general estate exemption and the insurance exemption are now telescoped, but $20,000 of exemption has
been lost in the process. However, the consolidated exemption figure
is still a liberal one, and will continue to result in exemption of the
estates of most decedents. Consistent with the net reduction in estate
tax exemptions, the new law reduces the overall gift tax exemption
from $40,000 to $30,000.8 In line also is the reduction of the annual
exclusion of value for gift tax purposes from $4,000 to $3,000.9 Yet
even at this reduced figure the affiuent citizen with numerous beneficiaries can continue to make substantial annual gifts without incurring
any gift tax liability.
COMMUNITY PROPERTY

The treatment of community property interests under section 402
of the I 942 Revenue Act must be considered one of the more important victories for the Treasury Department. Without attempting to
delve into the mysteries of the community property concept,1° it is
enough at this point to say that it gives the wife a qualified one-half
interest in the husband's earnings and acquisitions. But it is not a fullblown one-half interest as understood at the common law when we
speak of joint tenancies or tenancies in common. It is more nearly
characterized as an expectancy. If the wife survives the husband, she
is deemed to take her one-half interest by the law of community
and not by the law of intestate succession.
The earlier estate tax law was not equal to the community property
concept. Take the case where a husband predeceases his wife. What
is included in the husband's estate with respect to the property held in
community? Clearly, one-half is part of his estate. But what of the
half passing to his wife via the community channel? It is plain that
Revenue Act of 1942, § 404, amei;iding I. R. C., '§ 8 I I (g).
Revenue Act of 1942, § 414 (a), amending I. R. C., § 935 (c).
8 Revenue Act of 1942, § 455, amending I. R. C., § 1004. This reduction goes
into effect beginning with the calendar year 1943.
9 Revenue Act of 194-2, § 454, amending I. R. C., § 1003 (b) (2). This reduction goes into effect beginning with the calendar year 1943. It should also be noted
that under this section gifts in trust are again to have the benefit of this exclusion.
1 For a good discussion of the community property concept in its relation to the
federal estate tax, see I PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GrFT TAXATION, §§ 1.09; 4.11
(1942).
6
7

°
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this one-half is not part of the husband's estate in the usual sense.
Although subject to the husbancfs control during his lifetime, it was
not subject to his testamentary disposition and did not pass by the law
of intestate succession. It did not enter the husband's estate at the
time of his death and could not be taxed under the broad language of
section 8 I I (a) of the code. 11 But what of the special provisions
thoughtfully inserted by Congress into the estate tax law some years
ago requiring the inclusion in the estate of property passing by dower
or curtesy or by statutory estate in lieu thereof? 12 This language came ·
close, but the community property !dea was still too exotic to be assimilated into these, traditional common-law concepts.18 The same was
true of attempts to tax the wife's community interest as part of the
husband's estate under section 8 I~ ( e) relating to joint tenancies and
entireties. Again these terms came close to the community property
concept but not close enough.14 As a result the community property
states continued to be a law unto themselves. The interest made consummate in the wife upon the husband's death was not included as part
of his taxable estate even though he had controlled and made beneficial
use of the property during his lifetime. In the more prosaic states
where the law of community property continued to be regarded as a
mystifying civil law concept and symbol of tax privilege, husbands'
estates were taxed on property passing to their widows by dower, joint
tenancy or entireties. Here was a basic lack of uniformity in the federal
tax system--:--an anomaly already widely publicized in regard to income
taxes, but one, it should be remembered, which disfigured the estate
tax landscape as well.
This situation Congress has now remedied as far as the estate tax
is concerned. Section 402 (b) of the act amends section 8 I I ( e) of the
Internal Revenue Code by adding thereto a second paragraph reading
as follows:
"(2) Community interests.- To the extent of the interest
therein held as community property by the decedent and surviving spouse under the law of any State, Territory, or possession
of the United States, or any foreign country, except such part
thereof as may be shown to have been received as compensation
for personal services actually rendered by the surviving spouse or
11 "To the extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the time of his
death••••"
12 I. R. C., § 811 (b).
18 See I PAUL, FEDERAL EsTATE AND G1Fr TAXATION, § 5.05 (1942).
14 Id., §· 8.08.
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derived originally from such compensation or from separate
propeftY of the surviving spouse. In no case shall such interest
included in the gross estate of the decedent be less than the value
of such part of the community property as was subject to the decedent's power of testamentary disposition." 15
This amendment in effect places community property in the same
general category as property held by joint tenancies or entireties, and
prescribes the same estate tax treatment. Property passing to a wife
by community is now included in the decedent's taxable estate except
to the extent that it is shown to be economically attributable to the
survivor. This corresponds to the analogous treatment of joint tenancies and entireties, where an exemption can be claimed by the de,;cedent's estate for that part of the property proportionate to the contribution made by the survivor in its purchase or acquisition.
Undoubtedly the argument will be made that the new section is
unconstitutional on the ground that it arbitrarily places in the decedent's taxable estate property which under local law does not pass by
will or law of intestate succession. But the rejection of kindred arguments in othet cases 16 and the Supreme Court's unwillingness to
subordinate substance to form in determining whether a given transfer
has a testamentary quality leave no substantial ground for believing
that this treatment of community interests will be held invalid.
Digressing from estate taxes for a moment, it may well be asked:
now that community property has lost its special caste within the
framework of the estate tax law, how much longer will it be until
Congress takes the next step of abolishing special privilege in the community states under the income tax law? There seems to be no justification for a system which in one state taxes a husband upon all of his
earned income, but in another state permits husband and wife to file
15 Revenue Act of 1942, § 402 (b), amending I. R. C., § 8II (e). Under §§
402 (a) and 404 (a) of the act appropriate changes are made in the sections relating
to transfers in contemplation of death, revocable transfers and life insurance to conform
them to the treatment prescribed for community property under § 402 (b).
Section 45 3 of the act amends § 1000 of the code so as to treat gifts of community property as the husband's gifts for gift tax purposes except to the extent that
the property is traceable to the wife. '
For the committee comments on § 402 of the act, see H. REP. 2333, 77th
Cong., 2d sess. (1942), p. 160, and S. REP. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d sess. (1942),
p. 231.
.
16 See Tyler v. United States, 281 U. S. 497, 50 S. Ct. 356 (1930); United
States v. Jacobs, 306 U. S. 363, 59 S. Ct. 551 (1939); Helvering v. City Bank
Farmers' Trust Co., 296 U. S. 85, 56 S. Ct. 70 (1935); Helvering v. Bullard, 303
U. S. 297, 58 S. Ct. 565 (1938).
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separate returns each on one-half of the husband's income. This issue
unfortunately has been confused with the broader issue of compulsory
joint returns for all married couples, and the co.mmunity property bloc
in Congress has so far staged a successful fight to retain this preferred
treatment. Curiously there seems to have been no organized oppositidn
to the estate tax amendment respecting community property comparable
to the opposition which made itself articulate when the Treasury proposed a corresponding change in the income tax law. The answer seems
to be that the estate tax does not hit as many people as the income tax.
But the handwriting is now on the wall. It is written plainly in section
8 I I ( e) of the Internal Revenue Code.
PowERs oF APPOINTMENT
I

The treatment of powers of appointment under the federal estate
tax law has been the subject of considerable discussion. Under the
earlier law, Congress attempted to handle the subject of powers in a
very simple way. It required that there be included in the estate
"property passing under a general power of appointment exercised by
the decedent." 17 Quite obviously, this language had a narrow application. In the first place, it did not even touch special powers. Lawyers
intent on avoiding the application of this section could easily create
special powers of a broad scope, and the exercise of those powers would
not bring the property covered thereby into the decedent's taxable
estate. Secondly, under the language quoted it was necessary that the
property pass by an exercise of the power. It was not sufficient that
the property be subject to the donee's power. In the case of a general
power, the donee enjoys a broad power of control and disposition
which he can exercise in favor of himself, his estate or creditors. Yet,
under the earlier law, the relinquishment of this power at death
through nonexercise was not regarded as a taxable incident. This contrasted curiously with other situations arising under the estate. tax law
where the surrender, relinquishment or extinction at death of powers
of control or mere possibilities of ownership was sufficient to bring
property within the decedent's taxable estate.18 Finally, under the
17 I. R. C., § 811 (f). Prior to the insertion of this language into the statute, it
had been held that property subject to a general power exercised by the decedent was
not part of his general estate for estate tax purposes. United States v. Field, 255 U. S.
257, 41 S. Ct. 256 (1921).
18 See I. R. C., § 8II (d), and such cases as Porter v. Commissioner, 28~ U. S.
436, 53 S. Ct. 451 (1933); Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U. S._39, 60
S. Ct. 51 (1939); also I. R. C., § 8II (c) and Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106,
60-S. Ct. 444 (1940).
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earlier law, it was necessary that the property pass under a general
power exercised by the decedent. The decedent may have been the
donee of a general power~ He may have exercised the same at death.
Yet it did not follow that the property passed by the exercise of the
power. If the persons named as beneficiaries by the decedent happened
to be the persons named by the donor of the power as takers in default
in case of nonexercise by the donee, they might renounce the appointment and elect to take as takers in default. Exactly this situation was
presented in H elvering v. Grinnell,19 where the Supreme Court held
that in the event of such renunciation of the appointment by the takers
in default, the property did not pass by exercise of the power and
hence was not includible in the donee's estate. This was a plausible
construction of the statute even though not one calculated to increase
the usefulness of the powers section as a revenue producer.
Not only did the earlier law by its language invite a restricted interpretation, but the distinctions it suggested were fruitful of argument
and litigation. When was a power sufficiently lacking in generality to
be classified as a special power? What restrictions, however nominal,
would take a power out of the taxable class? What effect was to be
given local law in the definition of a general power? Under what circumstances and to what extent could appointees be deemed to take as
takers in default under the donor's estate rather than under the donee's
estate? Was a formal renunciation necessary before the doctrine of
the Grinnell case could be applied?
The limited taxation of powers under the earlier law contrasted
with the apparently broader taxation of powers under state inheritance
tax laws. A number of states levied inheritance taxes on property sub. ject to the decedent's power of appointment. No distinction was made
between general and special powers, nor was it material that the power
was not exercised by the decedent.
It was not surprising, therefore, that proposals should have been
made for a wider taxation of powers under the estate tax law and a
complete restatement of the section on powers. These questions were
brought into the open in an able debate between Professors Griswold
and Leach of Harvard.20 Professor Griswold led off with a broadside
attack on the existing statute: it was limited in its scope, presented
difficulties of interpretation, and in general was quite inadequate. The
19

294 U.S. 153, 55 S. Ct. 354 (1935).

Griswold, "Powers of Appointment and the Federal Estate Tax," 52 HARV. L.
REV. 929, 967 (1939); Leach, "Powers of Appointment and the Federal Estate Tax
-A Dissent," 52 HARV. L. REV. 961 (1939).
20
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statute should be amended so as to eliminate the requirement~ of
"exercise" and "passing," and with its fangs thus sharpened should be
extended to include special as well as general powers. Special powers
should be taxed both because it was easy to camouflage what was substantially a general power and make it look like a special power, and
because the continued exemption of special powers would make it possible for successive generations to defeat tax liability by repeated use
of the life est:i,te plus special power pattern. To the proposals that the
statute be amended to include the nonexercise well as exercise of a
power and to extend to special as well as general powers, Profess9r
Leach took sharp exception. It seemed sensible to draw a 1ine between
exercise and nonexercise of a power. After all, the federal estate tax
. took its full toll of the property when it passed out of the donor's
estate. Why impose a double tax on what was essentially a single transfer unless the donee actually exercised the power? Professor Leach's
strongest strictures were reserved for the suggestion that special powers be ~ubject to the federal estate tax. To him this proposal seemed
iniquitous, since in most cases special powers were created for legitimate family purposes and the tax statute should not penalize their
use. However, Professor Griswold had suggested the possibility of
exempting powers to appoint among the children of the donor or the
donee, and Professor Leach agreed that if this suggestion were amplified, he and his colleague might find themselves in substantial agreement. In the end their differences seemed to be differences on the form
of the proposed statutory revision.
The subject was further canvassed in an article by Mr. Montgomery Angell.21 His argument followed an entirely different slant.
Taking cognizance of the historical development of powers, Mr.
Angell suggested that the distinction be clearly observed between
reserved and granted powers. Where a person making a disposition of
property reserves a power to himself and thus in effect constitutes
himself both donor and donee, it is proper that the property be in. eluded in his estate upon the extinction of the reserved power, and_
this is already accomplished under section 8 r r ( d) of the Internal
Revenue Code. But where a donee possesses a granted power over
property already taxed in the donor's estate, there is no excuse for
taxing either the exercise or nonexercise thereof in the donee's estate.
In pressing this argument Mr. Angell saw no point in distinguishing

as

21 "The Impact of the Law of Powers Upon our Internal Revenue Laws," 39
MrcH. L. REv. 1269 ( I 941).
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between general and special powers. By taking this position on the
taxation of powers, Mr. Angell not only opposed Professor Griswold's
proposal for amplification of the powers section but even suggested its
entire deletion.
In the wake of the discussion by Messrs. Griswold, Leach and
Angell appeared the thoroughgoing treatment of the subject in Randolph Paul's Federal Estate and Gift Taxation. 22 Paul, like Griswold,
found much to criticize in the statutory language and agreed that legislative revision was needed both in order to broaden the reach of the
powers section and to eliminate troublesome questions of construction.
In developing his suggestions on the broadening of the statutory
language, Mr. Paul stressed at considerable length the thought .that
in the ordinary case where A gives B a life estate, with power to appoint the remainder to his issue, the situation is much the same as if
A had created a life estate in B with remainder to B's issue. In the
latter case, the remainder to B's issue is taxed but once, namely, as
part of A's estate, and is not taxed as part of B's estate. Since it is "one
of the most elementary rules of sound tax policy . . • to levy similar
taxes on economically similar transactions and to avoid putting a premium on the choice of one particular legal form as against another of
substantially the same effect," 23 no tax should be levied on B's estate
in the case where B had been granted a life estate with power to appoint the remainder to his issue. Thus, as Mr. Paul saw it, the powers
problem reduced itself to "a search for a proper and practical border
line between those special powers that should reasonably be assimilated
to the vested remainder devise, and those that should reasonably be
assimilated to the grant of a general power." 24 Hence, he concluded
that the statute should be amended so as to treat special and general
powers alike, but with a specific exception in the case of special powers
exercisable exclusively for the benefit of either the donor's or the
donee's children. However, this exception should apply only where
the donee, if he exercised the power, was required to appoint the full
remainder to his or the donor's children, thereby excluding the possibility of successive grants from generation to generation of life estates
coupled with powers to appoint the remainder. 25 Furthermore, the
statute should be amended to eliminate the requirement that the power
C. 9 (1942).
1 PAur., FEDERAL
24 Id. 479-480.
25 Id. 480.
22

28

ESTATE AND
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478 (1942).
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be exercised. In the · end, Mr. Paul's views closely approximated
Professor Griswold's.
The amendment of the powers section, through the enactment of
section 403 of the Revenue Act of I 942, represents a sweeping triumph for the Griswold-Paul camp. Section 8 II (f) of the code is
amended so as to require inclusion in the decedent's· taxable estate of
property "with respect to which the decedent has at the time of his
death a power of appointment.. -.." Thus it is no longer necessary that
the power be exercised by the decedent. Obviously, this likewise serves
to eliminate the need for "passing."
"Power of appointment" is defin~d to mean
" ... any power to appoint exercisable by the decedent either alone
or in conjunction with any person, except
·
"(A) a power to appoint within a class which does not include any others than the spouse of the decedent, spouse of the
creator of the power, descendants of the decedent or his spouse,
descendants ( other than the decedent) of the creator of the power
or his spouse, spouses of such descendants, donees described in
section 812(d), and donees described in section 861(a) (3). As
used in this subparagraph, the term 'descendant' includes adopted
and illegitimate descendants, and the term 'spouse' includes a former spouse; and
"(B) a power to appoint within a restricted class if the decedent did not receive any beneficial interest, vested or contingent, in the property from the creator of the power or
thereafter acquire any such interest, and if the power is not exercisable to any extent for the benefit of the decedent, his estate, his
creditors, or the creditors of his estate." 26
The exemptions allowed in subparagraph (A) for special powers
exercisable in favor of members of the family and in subparagraph
(B) for special powers held in trust are sufficiently liberal to preserve
the usefulness of the special powers as a flexible means of disposition.
They should serve to meet the objections and arguments raised by
Professor Leach in his debate with Professor Griswold.
In order to prevent an unfair a~plication of the amended statute
26 Revenue Act of 1942, §403 (a), amending I. R. C., § 811 (f). For the corresponding change in the gift tax law, see § 452 (a) of the act, which amends
I. R. C., § 1000.
For the committee reports on the power of .appointment amendments see H.
REP. 2333, 77th Cong., 2nd sess. (1942), pp. 160-161, and S. REP. 1631, 77th
Cong.,' 2d sess. (1942), pp. 232-234.
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to cases where powers were created in reliance on the earlier law, it is
expressly provided that the amendments shall not apply to ( 1) special
powers created before the new law was passed unless exercised thereafter; ( 2) general powers created before the new law was passed, if
at the time of the enactment the donee was under a legal disability to
release the power and thereafter releases the same within six months
after removal of the disability; (3) any powers created before the
new law was passed, if released before January 1, 1942 or not exercised
by persons dying before January 1, 1943.21 Prudent tax advice to
donees of powers granted before October 21, 1942, should follow these
lines: If you are the donee of a general power, release it before January 1, 1943. If you are the donee of a special power, either release it
before January 1, 1943, or be sure not to exercise it thereafter unless
of course it is one of the special powers exempt from tax, such as a
power exercisable in favor of the family or held in trust.
LIFE INSURANCE

Under the earlier law the sections dealing with the taxation of life
insurance proceeds were simple and Spartanlike.28 They required the
inclusion in the gross estate of proceeds payable to the decedent's
estate, and, subject to a $40,000 exclusion, the amounts receivable
"by all other beneficiaries as insurance under policies taken out by
the decedent upon his own life." 29 In its application to policies payable
to executors, this section created no major difficulties. But respecting
policies payable to all other beneficiaries, the simple statutory words
proved to be a fertile source of conflicting interpretations. Taken at its
face, the language suggested no difficulties except possibly that there
could be some argument as to when a policy was "taken out by a decedent." But even here it seemed sensible to suggest that a decedent
took out a policy to the extent that he paid the premiums therefor.
Accordingly, giving simple words a simple construction, the section
seemed to require the inclusion in the taxable estate of insurance proceeds payable to specific beneficiaries to the extent that the decedent
had purchased the same by means of his premium payments. This was
the position originally taken by the Treasury Department in its regu27 Revenue Act of 1942, § 403 (d). Comparable provisions are found in §
(b) on the effective date of the new powers provisions of the gift tax law resulting from amendment of § 1000 of the I. R. C.
28 For a thorough treatment of the insurance clause under the estate tax law, see

452

1 PAUL, FEDERAL EsTATE AND GxFT TAXATION, c. IO (1942).
29

I. R. C., § 811 (g).
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lations. so Buf then came ominous Supreme Court decisions which cast
a shadow upon the propriety of the regulations and, in turn, upon the
validity of any statute authorizing such a construction.31 Although the
proposition was not stated in categorical terms, the thought seemed
implicit that estate taxation of insurance payable to specific beneficiaries
was arbitrary and capricious, hence unconstitutional, unless death
marked the relinquishment by the· decedent of powers of ownership
over the policy; only in the case of such relinquishment did the ripening of the beneficiary's rights under the policy have a testamentary
flavor justifying its classification along with other items properly includ.ed i~ the decedent's estate.
Duly impressed by what it believed to be the handwriting on the
wall, the Treasury Department trimmed its sails and in the next ·
edition of ifs regulations took the position that proceeds of policies
payable to specific beneficiaries were not to be .included in the gross
estate unless the decedent had retained "incidents of ownership" until
the time of his death. 32 Among so-called incidents of ownership were
the power to change beneficiaries, borrow on the policy, cash in on its
surrender value, etc. At the same time, it was recognized that the
policy had to be taken out by the decedent. But unless the decedent
had retained any of the incidents of ownership, the proceeds were not
taxable as part of the estate even though the decedent had paid the
premiums. In view of this interpretation it became evident that life
insurance furnished a handy means of estate tax avoidance.
But the paths of tax avoidance are thorny and bestrewn with un. certainties. After it had been comfortably settled that retention of incidents of ownership was ·a sine qua non to taxation, the Court of Claims
upset the applecart in its historic decision in the firs~ Bailey case.ss The
Bailey case was mired in issues, and three judicial rinsings were necessary for their complete disposition.s4, Our concern now is with the first
so TREAS. REG. 37 (1921 ed.), arts. 32, 34-35; TREAS. REG. 63 (1922), arts.
27, 29-30; TREAS. REG. 68 (1924), arts. 25, 27-28; TREAS. REG. 70 (1926 ed.),
arts. 25, 27; TREAS. REG. 70 (1929 ed.) arts. 25, 27.
81 See Lewellyn v. Frick, 268 U. S. 238, 45 S. Ct. 487 (1925); Chase National Bank v. United States, 278 U. S. 327, 49 S. Ct. 126 (1929); l3ingham v.
United States, 296 U. S. 2II, 56 S. Ct. 180 (1935); In(Justrial Trust Co. v. United
States, 296 U. S. 220, 56 S. Ct. 182 (1935).
82 TREAS. REG. 80 (1934 ed.), art. 25; TREAS. REo. 80 (1937 ed.), art. 25.
88 Bailey v. United States, 89 Ct. Cl. 364, 27 F. Supp. 617 (1939).
3 4. 89 Ct. Cl. 364, 27 F. Supp. 617 (1939); 89 Ct. Cl. 376, 30 F. Supp. 184
(1939); 90 Ct. Cl. 644, 31 F. Supp. 778 (1940).
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decision, in which, to the amazement of all, including the Treasury
Department, the court held that retention of incidents of control was
not necessary in order to warrant inclusion in the taxable estate of life
insurance taken out by the decedent. Not only did the Court of Claims
find that the "incidents of ownership" test was a spurious interpretation
of the statute which flew in the face of its simple language, but the
court determined that the statute stripped of this construction was still
constitutional. In view of the changing climate of judicial opinion in
high places) it was not surprising that the Court of Claims should have
reached the result it did on the constitutional issue. A greater source of
astonishment was its disregard of Treasury Regulations of long standing in its interpretation of the statute.
If the decision in the first Bailey case was correct, it meant that the
initial Treasury interpretation was valid: insurance payable to specific
beneficiaries is taxable as part of the estate to the extent that the decedent paid the premiums on the policy. Obviously the Bailey case
called for a redefinition of the Treasury's position. The- Treasury responded with T. D. 5032, issued January rn, I94I.85 Briefly stated, T. D. 5032 provided that as to all insurance taken out thereafter
taxability would depend solely upon the payment of premiums by the
decedent. This was the Bailey case as prospectively applied. As to
insurance taken out by the decedent before January IO, I94I, where
incidents of ownership had been disposed of before that date the proceeds would be taxable only in proportion to the premiums paid after
that date. This was a repudiation of the Bailey case as retroactively applied and indicated the Treasury's willingness to stand behind action
taken in reliance upon its earlier rulings. Where a decedent on January
IO, I94I, possessed incidents of ownership under a policy taken out
before that date, taxability would turn solely upon payment of premiums. This in a sense was a retroactive application of the new regulation and of the rule of the Bailey case, but the retroactive feature could
not be considered prejudicial. T. D. 5032 seemed to be a fair treatment
of a difficult question.
But could the new regulations stand as a valid interpretation of
the statute in view of the muddled judicial and administrative history
that had preceded it? This question Congress answered in the Revenue
Act of I942.
Section 8n (g) of the code, the section dealing with insurance
under the estate tax law, is completely revised through the enactment
85

1941-1 CuM. BuLL. 427.
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of section 404 of the Revenue Act of I942. Of special interest at this
point" is the ~mended language of the paragraph dealing with insurance
payable to beneficiaries other than the executors. It now reads as
follows:

"(2) Receivable _by other beneficiaries.-To the extent of the
amount receivable by all other beneficiaries as insurance under
policies upon the life of the decedent (A) purchased with premiums, or other consideration, paid directly or indirectly by the
decedent, in proportion that _the amount so paid by the decedent
bears to the total premiums paid for the insurance, or (B) with
respect to which the decedent possessed at his death any of the
incidents of ownership, exercisable either alone or in conjunction
with any other person: For the purposes of clause (A) of this
paragraph, if the decedent transferred, by assignment or otherwise, a policy of insurance, ,the amount paid directly or indirectly
by the decedent shall be reduced by an amount which bears the
same ratio to the amount paid directly or indirectly by the decedent as the consideration in money or money's worth received
by the decedent for the transfer bears to the value of the policy
at the time of the transfer. For the purposes of clause (B) of this
paragraph, the term 'incident of ownership' does not include a
reversionary interest." 36
•
Briefly stated, the e:ffect of the above language is to tax as part of
the decedent's estate insurance payable to specific beneficiaries (a) if
and to the extent that the decedent paid the premiums therefor directly
or indirectly, or (b) if the decedent at time of death possessed incidents of ownership, exercisable either alone or in conjunction with any
oth~r person.87 Thus the statute ~ amended not only confirms the
view of the first Bailey case, as incorporated in T. D. 5032, that payment of premiums by the decedent warrants taxation of the proceeds,
but ·goes further and retains the "incidents of ownership" test as an
alternative basis of taxation. In other words, the proceeds are taxable
36 Revenue Act of 1942, § 404 (a), amending I. R. C., § 8II (g). For the
committee reports on the insurance amendments, see H. REP. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d
sess. (1942), pp.· 162-163, and S. REP. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d sess. (1942), pp.
234-236.
87 Attention is called to the fast sentence of § 8 l I (g) ( 2) of the code as
amended: "For the purposes of clause (B) of this paragraph, the term 'incident of
ownership' does not include a reversionary interest." Congress has thus repudiated the ·
holding of the Court of Claims in the second rehearing of Bailey v. United States, 90
Ct. CI. 664, 31 F. Supp. 778 (1940), a holding which in turn was based upon the
court's interpretation of Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. rn6, 60 S. Ct. 444 (1940).
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if the decedent paid the premiums even though he retained no incidents of ownership, and they are taxable if the decedent retained
incidents of ownership even though he paid no premiums. A fortiori,
they are taxable if both conditions exist.
Conforming to the policy embodied in T. D. 5032, the amendment
includes a clause designed to prevent an unfair retroactive application
of its provisions:

"(c) Decedents to Which Amendments Applicable.-The
amendments made by subsection (a) shall be applicable only to
estates of decedents dying after the date of the enactment of this
Act; but in determining the proportion of the premiums or other
consideration paid directly or indirectly by the decedent (but not
the total premiums paid) the amount so paid by the decedent on
or before January IO, r94r, shall be excluded if at no time after
such date the decedent poss~sed an incident of ownership in the
policy." 38
According to this provision the amendments made by subsection
(a), i. e. those stating ~he two alternative tests for determining taxability of insurance proceeds, apply only to estates of decedents dying
after enactment of the Revenue Act of I 942. As to estates of decedents
dying before the e:ffective date of the new act, the old law continues
to govern. But in view of the Bailey case and T. D. 5032, what was the
old law? It is consistent with the statute as amended to recognize T. D.
5032 as a correct interpretation of the earlier statute. Moreover, Congress has accepted January ro, r94r, the date of promulgation of
T. D. 5032, as the date when taxpayers were put on notice that thereafter payment of premiums would in itself make the proceeds taxable
to their estates. This appears to be a confirmation of T. D. 5032 as a
correct interpretation of the earlier law.
To take illustrative situations, the statute as amended will apply in
the following way with respect to persons dying after 4:30 P. M.
October 2rst, r942, where the insurance was taken out before that
date:
(I) If the decedent retainea. incidents of ownership over the policy,
all the proceeds are taxable regardless of whether he paid the premiums or any part thereof;
( 2) If the decedent possessed no incident of ownership over the
policy at the time of death but did possess incidents of ownership
88

Revenue Act of 1942, § 404 (c), amending I. R. C., § 8II (g).
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after January ro, r 941, the proceeds are taxable to the extent that the
decedent paid the premiums on the policy;
(1) If the decedent possessed no incident of ownership after January ro, r94r, the proceeds are taxable in proportion to the premiums
paid by the decedent after January ro, r 94r.
The amendment of the insurance section has done much to clarify
one of the most troublesome sections of the estate tax law. Hereafter,
the administrative and judicial problems of interpretation should be
greatly reduced.
DEDUCTIONS AND MISCELLANE~US

Under the earlier law an odd situation existed with respect to the
taking of deductions. The estate tax law has at all times permitted a
deduction against the gross estate for claims outstanding against the
decedent at time of his death. 89 This is fair enough, since allowance
should be made for the payment of such claims before the government
exacts its tribute. However, a complication develops under an estate
tax law which sweeps into the taxable estate not only the property
actually passing by will or intestate succession but additional interests
such as insurance proceeds, property originally transferred by inter
vivas trusts where the decedent retained control, etc. In these latter
cases the property was in the estate only for tax purposes. Situations
have arisen where the property actually in the estate was less than
the amount of provable claims against the estate, i. e., the estate was
insolvent. Yet the taxable estate may have exceeded the amount of
provable claims, because of the inclusion of insurance proceeds, inter
vivas trust property or some other such items. These other items could
not be reached to pay the creditors' claims since they were n9t in the
general estate. Under these circumstances, could a deduction be taken
for estate tax purposes on these claims in excess of the amount of estate
assets available for their satisfaction? In view of the wording a£ the
earlier statute, courts answered this question in the affirmative.40 This
will no longer be true under, the new act, which in subsection (a) of
section 405 amends section 812 (b) of .the code by inserting the following new sentences after the second sentence thereof:
" .... There shall be disallowed the amount by which the deductions specified in paragraphs (r), (2), (3), (4), and (5) exceed
39

I. R. C., § 812 (b) (3).

40

See cases cited in

2 (1942).

I PAUL, FEDERAL

EsTATE

AND

GxFr

TAXATION

553, note

1942]

REVENUE AcT OF I

942

the value, at the time of the decedent's death, of property subject to
claims. For the purposes of this section the term 'property subject
to claims' means property includible in the gross estate of the decedent which, or the avails of which, would, under the applicable
law, bear the burden of the payment of such deductions in the
final adjustment and settlement of the estate; and, for the purposes of this definition, the value of the property shall be reduced
by the amount of the deduction under the next sentence attributable to such property." 41
Under the earlier law a gross inequity existed in the case where
a decedent during his lifetime had in good faith executed a pledge for
a charitable purpose but had failed to pay the same before his death.
According to the law of a good many states, the pledge represented an
enforcible claim against the estate notwithstanding the difficulties raised
by the common-law doctrine of consideration. But could the amount
of the pledge paid by the executor be taken as a deduction against the
gross estate for tax purposes? Clearly it could not be allowed as a bequest 'to a charity since the decedent had not made a gift by will. The
more substantial argument was that this was a claim against the estate
for which the usual deduction should be allowed under section 8 I 2 (b)
( 3) of the code. Yet, this section permitted deductions for claims
founded upon a promise or agreement "to the extent that they were
contracted bona fide and for an adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth." When the question reached the Supreme
Court, it held in the Taft case that no deduction could be allowed,
since a pledge was not contracted "for adequate and full consideration
ih money or money's worth." 42 The Court's result was justified in
view of the statutory language quoted. But the result was manifestly
unjust. To its credit, Congress has now remedied this injustice. Section
406 (a) of the I 942 act amends section 8 I 2 (b) of the code by inserting before the period at the end of the second sentence thereof the
following:
" ; except that in any case in which any such claim is founded
upon a promise or agreement of the decedent to make a contribution or gift to or for the use of any donee described in. subsection
( d) for the purposes specified therein, the deduction for such
41 Revenue Act of 1942, § 405, amending I. R. C., § 812 (b). For the committee reports on this amendment, see H. REP. 2 3 3 3, 77th Cong., 2d sess. ( l 942),
pp. 163-165, and S. REP. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d sess. (1942), pp. 236-238.
42 Taft v. Commissioner, 304 U.S. 351, 58 S. Ct. 891 (1938).
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claim shall not be so limited, but shall be limited to the extent
that it would be allowable as a deduction under subsection ( d) if
such promise or agreement constituted a bequest." 48
Substantially related to the foregoing is the amendment of section
812 (d) of the code by means of section 408 of the 1942 act to provide
that deductible bequests shall include the interest which falls into any
such bequest as a result of an irrevocable disclaimer of a testamentary
gift. The usual case affected by this a~endment is that where a decedent makes a gift of the residue under his will to a charity, after
having made specific gifts to other beneficiaries. Under the earlier law,
if the beneficiary of a specific gift disclaimed the gift and thereby in
effect added to the residue given to the charity, it was doubtful
whether an additional charitable deduction could be claimed for the
amount so disclaimed, since the decedent had not himself made the
gift by will.41, Here again the recent amendment serves to correct an
injustice.
Congress has long intended that property once subject to an estate
tax should not be subjected to a recurring estate tax unless at least five
years intervene between the two taxes.45 The object is to prevent an
unfair "turnover" in estate taxes. This situation is especially acute in
the case where the deaths of both husband and wife take place in a
short time, and the resulting succession of estate taxes on the property
passing from one to the other would seem unjust. Unfortunately, the
earlier statute creating estate tax immunity on the same property for
five-year intervals was defectively drafted and failed to achieve its
intended objective. Section 407 of the new act cures this defect.46
Under the federal estate tax law a credit has been allowed for a
state death tax levied on the same property but not to exceed 80% of
the basic estate tax. 47 The death tax laws of a good many states have
been accommodated to this 80% credit provision and provide for an
automatic step-up of rates to absorb the 80% credit if their rates as
otherwise applied failed to do so. However, Congress has also allowed
a credit against the estate tax for federal gift taxes previously paid on
Revenue Act of 1942, § 406 (a), amending I. R. C., § 812 (b).
See the committee reports: H. REP. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d sess. (1942), pp.
166-167, and S. REP. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d sess. (1942), p. 240. This amendment is
made applicable to estates of decedents dying after February 10, 1939.
45 I. R. C., § 812 (c).
46 For the committee reports, see H. REP. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d sess. (1942),
pp. 165-166, and S. REP. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d sess. (1942), pp. 238-240. Attention
is called to the provisions _of this amendment giving it• a retroactive application.
47 I. R. C., § 813 (b).
43

44

1942]

REVENUE

AcT

OF

1942

the same property by the decedent,4 8 and under the earlier law the
estate tax was first reduced by the gift tax credit before computing the
maximum 80% allowance for state death tax credit. As a result of the
priority of the gift tax credit, the full 80% credit for state death taxes
was not allowed in a number of cases. This is now changed under section 4m of the 1942 act, which amends section 813 of the code to
provide that the credit for state death taxes will be allowed to the
extent of 80% of the full ba~ic estate tax unreduced by gift tax credit.
Under the earlier law, when the estate tax was augmented because of the inclusion in the taxable estate of property passing by a
general power of appointment exercised by the decedent, the burden of
the additional estate tax liability was really borne by the residuary
legatee. There was no authorization for the executor to charge to the
beneficiary taking under the exercise of the power a proportionate part
of the total estate tax liability. It was not unfair to make the residuary
legatee bear the total tax on all the property technically in the estate
since the decedent in the absence of directions to the contrary must
ha~e intended that the other beneficiaries take their interests free of
federal estate tax. But it could not be readily assumed that the decedent had jntended the residuary legatee to suffer a diminution of his
interest because of payment of estate taxes on property not actually in
the estate. In fact Congress had already provided for an apportionment
of liability against an insurance beneficiary in the case where payment
of the insurance proceeds had served to swell the taxable estate.''0 It
was obviously the fair thing to extend the same rule in the case of
augmentation of the taxable estate because of property subject to a
power in the hands of the decedent. In the new act Congress has coordinated the treatment of insurance proceeds and of property subject
to powers of appointment and has provided that unless the decedent
directs otherwise by will, persons receiving taxable insurance proceeds
or property subject to a power in the decedent's hands, shall be liable
to the executor for a proportionate part of the total estate tax.Go This
seems fair and proper.
The l 942 amendments to the estate and gift law represent a
notable achievement in statutory revision. However, the federal estate
I. R. C., § 813 (a).
I. R. C., § 826 (c).
so Revenue Act of 1942, § 404 (b), amending § 826 (c) of the code; § 403 (c)
amending§ 826 of the code by adding a new subsection (d). In this connection, see
also § 41 I of the 1942 act amending § 8 27 (b) of the code.
48
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tax is still not a model piece of legislation. Nothing has yet been done
to alter the confusing system of dual computation under which it is
necessary to determine both a basic and an additional tax, each with its
own system of exemptions and credits. And Congress has not acted to
determine more clearly the position of the gift tax in its relation to
both the estate tax and the income tax. But failure to remedy these
difficulties should not detract from the solid improvement now recorded in the law, an improvement that ,merits a word of compliment
for those whose painstaking efforts have contributed to this result.

